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Abstract: The iris pattern has significantly improved the biometric recognition field due to its high level of stability and
uniqueness. Such physical feature has played an important role in security and other related areas. How-
ever, presentation attacks, also known as spoofing techniques, can be used to bypass the biometric system
with artifacts such as printed images, artificial eyes, and textured contact lenses. To improve the security of
these systems, many liveness detection methods have been proposed, and the first Internacional Iris Liveness
Detection competition was launched in 2013 to evaluate their effectiveness. In this paper, we propose a hy-
perparameter tuning of the CASIA algorithm, submitted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences to the third
competition of Iris Liveness Detection, in 2017. The modifications proposed promoted an overall improve-
ment, with 8.48% Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) and 0.18% Bonafide Presentation
Classification Error Rate (BPCER) for the evaluation of the combined datasets. Other threshold values were
evaluated in an attempt to reduce the trade-off between the APCER and the BPCER on the evaluated datasets
and worked out successfully.
1 INTRODUCTION
Biometric recognition offers a natural and reliable
alternative for the automatic identification of individ-
uals based on their physiological or behavioral char-
acteristics (e.g. fingerprint, iris, gait, voice, hand ge-
ometry, etc.) [Jain et al., 2011]. The iris pattern is
regarded as one of the most accurate biometrics ow-
ing to its high level of stability and uniqueness. It has
played an important role in security and other associ-
ated fields [Tisse et al., 2002].
However, despite the many advantages, iris bio-
metric systems are highly susceptible to presentation
attacks, usually referred to as spoofing techniques,
that attempt to conceal or impersonate other identities
[Kohli et al., 2016, Menotti et al., 2015, Toosi et al.,
2017, Pala and Bhanu, 2017, Czajka and Bowyer,
2018,Sajjad et al., 2019,Tolosana et al., 2020]. Exam-
ples of typical iris spoofing attacks include printed iris
images, video playbacks, artificial eyes, and textured
contact lenses. Figure 1 presents some examples. We
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observe how difficult is to a human being make the
right judgment.
Figure 1: Spoofing problem. Which images are true or
fake? Sorting from left to right and from top to bottom,
the ones numbered as 1, 4 and 6 are the real ones.
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Therefore, in order to enhance the security of iris
recognition systems, liveness detection methods have
been suggested and can be categorized into software-
based and hardware-based techniques. In software-
based techniques, the spoof attacks are detected on the
sample that has already been acquired with a standard
sensor. Besides, they have the advantage of being less
expensive and less intrusive to the user.
In hardware-based techniques, physical character-
istics of the iris are measured, such as the behavior of
the pupil under different light conditions. Although
this approach usually presents a higher detection rate,
it has the disadvantage of being expensive and requir-
ing intervention at the device level [Galbally et al.,
2012].
To evaluate the efficiency of liveness detection
algorithms, the first international iris liveness con-
test was introduced in 2013, by Clarkson University,
Notre Dame University and Warsaw University of
Technology. The third contest was launched in 2017,
and included the combined dataset from West Virginia
University and IIIT-Delhi1.
The competition was open to all industrial and
academic institutions, and three software-based algo-
rithms were submitted for evaluation. They were eval-
uated by four datasets of live and spoof iris images,
represented by printed iris images, patterned contact
lenses, and printouts of patterned contact lenses. The
algorithm CASIA, from the Chinese Academy of Sci-
ences, designed a Cascade SpoofNets for iris liveness
detection and obtained the second-best results with a
combined error rate of 10.68% with an APCER of
11.88% and 9.47% BPCER, while the winner team,
an Anonymous submission, presented an APCER of
14.71% and BPCER of 3.36% [Yambay et al., 2017].
In this paper, a parameter tuning of the CASIA
SpoofNet is proposed. Through experiments, the op-
timal values of batch size, number of epochs, loss
function, learning rate, and weight decay were se-
lected. The suggested changes achieved better results
overall, with the exception of the Notre Dame dataset
evaluation, where the modified algorithm presented a
higher APCER.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
In Section II, other iris spoofing techniques are re-
viewed. In Section III, the databases used in our ex-
periments are described. In Section IV, the proposed
methodology is detailed. Experimental results are de-
scribed and discussed in Section V. Conclusions are
finally drawn in Section VI.
1But we could not reach the authors for obtaining this
last dataset
2 RELATEDWORK
Over the past few years, the vulnerability of iris
authentication systems to spoofing techniques has
been highly researched. In 2016, Kohli et al. [Kohli
et al., 2016] proposed a spoofing detection tech-
nique based on the textural analysis of the iris im-
ages. The method presented a unified framework
with feature-level fusion and combines the multi-
order Zernike moments, that encodes variations in the
structure of the image, with the Local Binary Pat-
tern Variance (LBPV), used for representing textural
changes. In [Pacut and Czajka, 2006], the authors in-
troduced three solutions on printed eye images based
on the analysis of image frequency spectrum, con-
trolled light reflection from the cornea, and the be-
havior of the iris pupil under light conditions. And
in [Lee et al., 2006], one may find a method using col-
limated IR-LED (Infra-Red Light Emitting Diode),
where the theoretical positions and distances between
the Purkinje images are calculated based on the hu-
man eye model. Both techniques depend on hardware
device resolution and in [Pacut and Czajka, 2006], the
subject cooperation is also required.
Recent works include Silva et al. [Silva et al.,
2015], which introduced a deep learning technique.
The area has been evolving and showing promising
results in several computer vision problems, such as
pedestrian detection [Ouyang and Wang, 2013], char-
acter recognition [Laroca et al., 2018, Laroca et al.,
2019a, Laroca et al., 2019b] and face recognition
[O. M. Parkhi and Zisserman, 2015].
Their approach addresses three-class image detec-
tion problems (textured contact lenses, soft contact
lenses, and no lenses), and uses a convolutional net-
work in order to build a deep image representation
and an additional fully-connected single layer with
softmax regression for classification.
3 DATASETS
In this section, the databases used in the experi-
ments are described. All of them are publicly avail-
able upon request and were used for the Iris Liveness
Detection competition of 2017. The images of the
databases are in grayscale and their dimensions are
640×480 pixels. Additional details are presented in
the following subsections.
3.1 Clarkson Dataset
The Clarkson dataset consists of three sections of im-
ages captured by an LG IrisAccess EOU2200 cam-
era. The first and second are live and patterned con-
tacts iris images and the third is composed of printouts
of live NIR iris images as well as printouts created
from visible light images of the eye captured with an
iPhone 5.
The training set comprises a total of 4937 images:
2469 live images from 25 subjects, 1346 printed im-
ages from 13 subjects as well as 1122 patterned con-
tact lens images from 5 subjects. The testing set in-
cludes additional unknown data and consists of 4066
images: 908 printed images, 765 patterned contact
images, and 1485 live iris images. In Figure 2, we
present some examples of live and fake images.
Figure 2: Clarkson Dataset: In the first and second columns
we present real and fake images, respectively.
3.2 Warsaw Dataset
The Warsaw dataset consists of authentic iris images
acquired by the IrisGuard AD 100 sensor and their
corresponding paper printouts. The training set in-
cludes 4513 images: 1844 live images from 322 dis-
tinct eyes and 2669 images of the corresponding paper
printouts. The testing set is composed of two subsets:
known and unknown spoof images.
Known spoofs subset includes 974 live iris images
acquired from 50 distinct eyes and 2016 images of the
corresponding printouts. The Unknown spoofs sub-
set includes 2350 live iris images acquired from 98
distinct eyes and 2160 images of the corresponding
printouts. In Figure 3, we present some examples of
live and fake images.
Figure 3: Warsaw Dataset: In the first and second rows we
present real and fake images, respectively.
3.3 IIITD-VWU Dataset
The IIITD-WVU dataset consists of samples acquired
using the IriShield MK2120U mobile iris sensor at
two different acquisition environments: indoors (con-
trolled illumination) and outdoors (varying environ-
mental situations).
The training subset comprises 6250 images, com-
bining 2,250 images of authentic irises and 4000 at-
tack iris images, including textured contact lens iris
images, printouts of live iris images, and printouts
of contact lens iris images. Besides, the testing sub-
set includes 4,209 iris images, 702 live iris images
and 3507 attack iris images, combining textured con-
tact lens iris images, printouts of live iris images and
printouts of contact lens iris images. In Figure 5, we
present some examples of live and fake images.
3.4 Notre Dame Dataset
The Notre Dame dataset consists of samples acquired
by LG 4000 and AD 100 sensors. The training subset
consists of 600 images of authentic irises and 600 im-
ages of textured contact lenses manufactured by Ciba,
UCL, and ClearLab. The testing subset is split into
known spoofs and unknown spoofs.
The known spoofs subset includes 900 images of
textured contact lenses and 900 images of authentic
irises. The unknown spoofs subset includes 900 im-
ages of textured contact lenses and 900 images of au-
Figure 4: CASIA SpoofNet architecture.
Figure 5: IIITD-WVU Dataset: In the first and second rows
we present real and fake images, respectively.
thentic irises. In Figure 6, we present some examples
of live and fake images.
4 PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The CASIA algorithm submitted to the competi-
tion considers two types of iris spoofings: a printed
iris and an iris with printed contact lenses. Since it
is difficult to identify printed iris of poor quality, the
printed iris and iris with contact lens are individu-
ally categorized. To this end, CASIA algorithm de-
signed a Cascade SpoofNet combining two convolu-
tional neural networks in sequence, SpoofNet-1 and
SpoofNet-2. SpoofNet-1 aims to distinguish printed
and non-printed iris images. If the iris image inputted
into the net is classified as a live sample, the iris is lo-
cated and the re-scaled iris image is classified by the
SpoofNet-2, to whether the sample is a live iris or a
contact lens.
Both SpoofNets are based on GoogleNet [Szegedy
et al., 2015] and consist of four convolutional layers
and one inception module. The inception module is
composed by layers of convolutional filters of dimen-
sion 1×1, 3×3 and 5×5, executed in parallel. It has
the advantage of reducing the complexity and improv-
ing the efficiency of the architecture, once the filters
of dimension 1x1 help reduce the number of features
before executing layers of convolution with filters of
higher dimensions. The architecture proposed and
their parameters (patch size/stride/filter dimension) is
presented in Figure 4.
In this paper, the iris of the images was located
manually in bounding boxes, using the graphical im-
Table 1: Competition comparison - Error rates by dataset.
Algorithm Threshold Clarkson Warsaw IIITD-WVU Notre Dame CombinedAPCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER
CASIA 50 9.61% 5.65% 3.40% 8.60% 23.16% 16.10% 11.30% 7.56% 11.88% 9.47%
Method Proposed
30 5.49% 0.00% 0.43% 2.94% 0.62% 31.9% 23.33% 0.27% 9.63% 1.49%
40 4.96% 0.00% 0.23% 3.82% 0.51% 34.61% 20.44% 0.72% 8.71% 1.90%
50 4.18% 0.00% 0.14% 4.60% 0.34% 36.89% 18.05% 0.94% 7.93% 2.32%
70 3.16% 0.06% 0.02% 6.70% 0.11% 41.31% 13.30% 1.40% 6.56% 3.37%
80 2.57% 0.20% 0.02% 8.40% 0.02% 43.58% 10.20% 2.20% 5.74% 4.15%
90 1.79% 0.47% 0.00% 9.05% 0.0% 49.85% 6.83% 3.20% 4.80% 5.64%
Table 2: Cross-dataset experiment - Error rates by dataset.
Algorithm Threshold Clarkson Warsaw IIITD-WVU Notre DameAPCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER APCER BPCER
Method Proposed
30 37.0% 0.0% 0.0% 66.6% 41.3% 0.7% 30.2% 1.6%
40 35.2% 0.0% 0.0% 67.9% 37.2% 0.9% 27.7% 2.4%
50 33.0% 0.0% 0.0% 70.0% 34.1% 1.1% 25.8% 2.6%
70 28.6% 0.0% 0.0% 75.0% 26.9% 2.3% 20.9% 3.4%
80 25.8% 0.1% 0.0% 77.8% 22.4% 3.1% 18.2% 3.6%
90 22.5% 0.1% 0.1% 81.4% 16.1% 4.8% 14.6% 4.6%
Figure 6: Notre Dame Dataset: In the first and second rows
we present real and fake images, respectively.
age annotation tool LabelImg (this process could be
done automatically but not so accurately using exist-
ing iris detection approaches [Severo et al., 2018, Lu-
cio et al., 2019]). The model was trained by 80% of
the training images and their corresponding iris im-
ages. The rest 20% were used as the validation sub-
set. In addition, the model was parameterized based
on the analysis of empirical experiments.
During training, many hyperparameters can influ-
ence the effectiveness of the resulted model. Too
many epochs might overfit the training data, while
too few may not give enough time for the network to
learn good parameters. To monitor the model’s per-
formance, the method EarlyStopping from the Keras
API was used with the loss function binary cross-
entropy. The patience parameter was set to 5 and
training of the model was executed with a maximum
of 20 epochs and batch size of 8.
The learning rate hyperparameter controls the
speed at which the model learns. Specifically, it con-
trols the amount of allocated error that the weights
of the model are updated. The lower the value, the
slower the model learns a problem. Typical values
of the learning rate are less than 1 and greater than
10e−6 [Goodfellow et al., 2016]. In this work, train-
ing was better with a learning rate of value 10e−5.
Finally, to reduce overfitting and improve the per-
formance of the model on new data, the default value
of weight decay was changed to 10−4 and a dropout
of 0.2 was employed for regularization. The main op-
timal parameters are summarized in Table 3.
Table 3: SpoofNet Hyperparameters Tuning
Parameter Values
Number of epochs (max) 20
Batch size 8
Learning rate 1e−5
Weight decay 10−4
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of the algorithm was evaluated
based on the APCER, i.e, the rate of misclassified at-
tack images, and the BPCER, i.e., the rate of misclas-
sified live images. Both APCER and BPCER were
calculated for each dataset individually, as well as for
the combination of all datasets.
Table 1 shows the error rates obtained by both CA-
SIA algorithm and the proposed modified CASIA al-
gorithm, in the evaluation of the datasets individually
and combined.
In the competition, the threshold value for de-
termining liveness was set at 50. Comparing the
error rates between the two algorithms, the pro-
posed method performed better overall, with the
only exception in the evaluation of the Notre Dame
dataset, where the proposed method presented a
higher APCER. Besides that, Clarkson dataset show-
cased the lowest error rates, with a combined error
rate of 4.18% APCER and 0% BPCER.
The presence of unknown spoofing attacks in the
testing subsets was the main difficulty during the pro-
cess of evaluation. Examining Table 1 and analyzing
the error rates presented by the proposed method, it is
noticeable the significant trade-off between APCER
and BPCER, once the model is not able to accurately
classify real and unknown attack variations.
Aiming to mitigate this trade-off, different values
of threshold were evaluated. Table 1 shows the error
rates presented by the proposed model to the thresh-
olds of values 30, 40, 70, 80 and 90.
The thresholds of values 70 to 90 helped reduce
gradually the difference of the error rates by reducing
the APCER and increasing the BPCER of the datasets
of Notre Dame and Clarkson university and for all
the datasets combined, but did not have the same ef-
fect on the Warsaw dataset, where it caused the in-
crease of the BPCER and the trade-off between the
error rates. In this dataset, however, the thresholds
of values 30 and 40 had a better effect, increasing
the APCER and reducing both the value of BPCER
and the trade-off with the dataset’s APCER. Note that
for the IIITD-WVU dataset the results obtained were
the worst among the compared datasets regarding the
BPCER
We also performed a cross-dataset experiment,
that is we trained the model using the data/images of
all datasets except the one where it is evaluated/tested.
The goal here is to observe the generalization power
of deep learning models and also verify how useful
these models are for realistic scenarios where there
is no data for a fine-tuning process. The results of
this experiment are summarized in Table 2. As can
be observe by comparing the figures of Table 2 and
Table 1, the models learned using this cross-dataset
scheme performed worse than the ones learned on its
own data. The less loss of performance is observed
on the Notre Dame dataset, anyway the figures of
APCER metrics are not suitable for some real-world
applications.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a hyperparameter tun-
ing of the neural network presented by the CASIA
algorithm, submitted to the Iris Liveness Detection
competition of 2017. Most of the databases evalu-
ated included unknown presentation attacks, being the
main difficulty to our model. The suggested modifica-
tions significantly reduced the values of APCER and
BPCER of the datasets.
The Clarkson dataset showcased the lowest error
rate, with 4.18% APCER and 0% BPCER for the
threshold of value 50. In an attempt to reduce the
trade-off between the values of APCER and BPCER,
different threshold values were evaluated. The thresh-
olds of values 70 to 90 worked out successfully for
the datasets of Clarkson and Notre Dame University
and all the datasets combined, reducing gradually the
dataset’s APCER. On the other hand, the thresholds
of values 30 and 40 had a better effect on the Warsaw
dataset, reducing the BPCER and the trade-off with
the dataset’s APCER.
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